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ABSTRACT
The unique nature of counterinsurgency
warfare in Afghanistan highlights the tactical
and technical challenges of the non-contigu-
ous battlefield. Although remote military out-
posts distant from their support hubs help
project NATO power, they also operate without
the advantages of a secure rear area or inter-
ior lines of communication. Commonly referred
to as ‘firebases’, these outposts typically house
a platoon or company-sized element and
present numerous challenges to the delivery of
medical care and support. Medical planners
and providers can mitigate many of these
inherent risks through targeted interventions
designed to increase the capabilities of these
remote outposts. These interventions include
focused higher-level trauma and non-trauma
medical training for both medical and non-
medical personnel, expanded equipment lists,
ongoing medical education, training and
rehearsals, and a proven and redundant com-
munications plan.
INTRODUCTION
We ask a great deal of our combat medics.
Despite relatively little training, they are
typically the first to respond, assess, stabil-
ise and treat most combat casualties.
Medics deliver life-altering and commonly
lifesaving care with poise and skill, often
under fire. Their efforts have led directly
to significant increases in the survivability
of modern combat wounds.1 Equally
important, medics’ trauma skills, refined
through ongoing advances in training and
doctrine accompanying the evolution of
the Tactical Combat Casualty Care pro-
gramme (TCCC), embolden US forces for
aggressive action; if injured, soldiers are
confident that their medics will provide
timely and effective on-scene medical
interventions and evacuation for definitive
care. What platoon would embark on a
mission without their medic?
Current tactics and techniques of coun-
terinsurgency warfare in Afghanistan
emphasise the challenges posed by the
non-contiguous battlefield.2 Remote, iso-
lated military outposts project military
power but operate without the advantages
of a secure rear area and present unique
medical challenges.3 4 Commonly referred
to as ‘firebases’, these outposts are typically
occupied by a platoon or company-sized
force (30–130 soldiers). In the absence of
reserve assets or nearby friendly forces,
threat assessment and planning become
paramount—particularly when employing
individual medics at remote sites without
direct medical supervision. Based on our
experiences in Afghanistan in 2007 and
2008 while serving as Battalion (RLW) and
Brigade Surgeons (AGT), respectively,
responsible for the delivery of tactical
health services, we recommend several tar-
geted interventions to mitigate the medical
threats posed by firebases: focused higher-
level trauma and non-trauma medical
training for both medical and non-medical
personnel; expanded equipment lists;
ongoing medical education, training and
rehearsals; and a proven and redundant
communications plan. This article dis-
cusses our approach to firebase medical
support by highlighting two separate
medical incidents: the grave wounding of a
coalition soldier soon after our arrival, and
the care provided to an enemy combatant




Medical support to firebases is not specific-
ally addressed in current military doctrine,
and the remoteness of firebases complicates
attempts to provide full-spectrum health
support.5 The standards of evacuation,
however, remain unchanged: all ‘urgent’
patients, for example, must arrive at loca-
tions with surgical capability within the
‘golden’ hour.6
The typical infantry battalion employs
two credentialed providers (a physician
and a physician assistant), a medical
administrative/planning officer and 24
medics and provides care for 500–1000
soldiers. This medical team is responsible
for all Role I medical care for the entire
battalion across the battlespace.7 One
medic is allocated to each infantry
platoon (50–60 soldiers); when platoons
operate independently or remotely, the
medic is the only on-hand medical
resource. Regardless of a medic’s level of
training or experience, he or she is the
point man for the platoon’s healthcare
needs: trauma care, primary care, physical
therapy and mental health.
New combat medics arrive at their first
duty station with the medical skills accu-
mulated during 16 weeks of medical train-
ing at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, USA.
This training primarily teaches medics
how best to care for combat casualties in
hostile, pre-hospital environments. Based
on current principles of TCCC and pre-
hospital trauma life support, medic train-
ing hinges on the ability to transport
patients to higher echelons for more
definitive care. In our current wars,
medics face demands outside their train-
ing focus—and perform tasks beyond
initial trauma care.
Ongoing analysis of real combat opera-
tions since 2001 highlighted the need for
expanded trauma and non-trauma training
for medics.8–11 Training has been adjusted
accordingly, with the addition of an add-
itional week of non-trauma clinical care
during initial medic training. Still, despite
a 3-week integrative skills-assessment field
exercise with simulated casualties, at no
time during a medic’s initial training does
he or she care for actual patients.12–14 As
a result, non-trauma skills such as the
evaluation and treatment of musculoskel-
etal injuries, common infections and der-
matological problems are rudimentary.
These subjects are not taught at a level to
permit a medic to evaluate and treat
patients without direct supervision, such
as that which occurs on a firebase.15
Additional ad hoc unit-based medical
training following initial instruction at Fort
Sam Houston is often rare. Infantry batta-
lions do not have physicians in garrison,
and the battalion physician assistant usually
works in an off-site clinic away from the
medics. Because medics are needed to
support daily training and also subject to
multiple non-medical taskings, they rarely
have the opportunity to participate in train-
ing beyond the minimum necessary to
maintain certification. These knowledge
and experience deficits manifest when
medics deploy to remote locations in a non-
doctrinal manner. This disparity between
mission requirements and troop capabilities
creates both medical and tactical risk.
MISSION ANALYSIS
Following initial combat operations in
Afghanistan in 2001–2002, most units
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conducted relief-in-place operations;
inbound units deployed their forces
according to the posture of departing
units. While planning for a deployment in
Eastern Afghanistan in 2007, our batta-
lion’s area of operation was altered
2 weeks prior to the deployment due to a
decision to double infantry forces in
eastern Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the
doubling of combat forces was not met by
any increase in area medical, surgical or
evacuation assets. On arrival, our battal-
ion was tasked to assume responsibility
for a province the size of Wales. The
updated mission also called for supporting
additional firebases without additional
organic medical personnel. The medical
platoon’s challenge was to provide
point-of-injury care for all traumatic injur-
ies, deliver routine medical care to a
1000-person coalition force and partner
with local health ministries to facilitate
targeted health sector development across
a vast mountainous region with minimal
ground access and unpredictable air
access. Further complicating matters, the
platoon packed their medical equipment,
shipped by sea to the original area of
responsibility, prior to the change in the
mission. Once in Afghanistan, unloading,
repacking, and transporting personnel and
equipment to the new areas took several
weeks. Fortunately, medics intentionally
hand-carried aid bags and initial treatment
equipment during their movement into
Afghanistan, allowing them to deliver
essential care immediately. During this
transition period, the unit sustained its
first casualty.
CASUALTY CARE ON ARRIVAL
On a cold evening in February 2007 in a
volatile district in eastern Afghanistan, an
explosion rocked a guard tower on a
platoon-sized firebase. The soldier manning
the tower was discovered on the ground
unconscious, and the platoon medic, the
sole medical asset on the small firebase,
quickly evaluated the patient. The patient
had an altered level of consciousness and
presented with dyspnoea. During examin-
ation, the medic noted unequal rise and fall
of the patient’s chest. While the medic was
preparing to intervene, the patient lost con-
sciousness. Acting promptly, the medic per-
formed needle decompression for a
suspected pneumothorax. The patient
regained consciousness and his breathing
normalised. A 9-line Medical Evacuation
(MEDEVAC) request was denied due to
severe weather conditions and soon after
communication with higher headquarters
was lost. The patient was loaded into the
back of an up-armoured truck—the only
armoured platform then available in
Afghanistan—and driven to the battalion
aid station over unlit, unimproved roads
known to be littered with improvised
explosive devices. The 30-mile trip took
3 h. In the confined space of the vehicle, en
route care was limited to monitoring con-
sciousness and pulse oximetry. As the small
convoy departed the firebase with the cas-
ualty and the platoon’s lone medic, the fire-
base lost all on-site medical support for the
remaining 24 soldiers.
This event highlighted several weaknesses
of the original medical support plan. In
response, four refinements were implemen-
ted: innovative medical training, personnel
augmentation, equipment improvements
and an enhanced communications plan.
Training initiatives
Prior to deployment, the initial mission
analysis called for the medical platoon to
provide support in a non-doctrinal manner
by dividing among four bases. The phys-
ician and physician assistant were to be
positioned at the two locations with the
greatest risk of casualties, and the two most
experienced medics would supervise the
other two bases. Recognising the risks
inherent in this model, the platoon under-
went aggressive pre-deployment medical
training. All medics underwent a 5-day long
tailored TCCC course, primarily focused
on the recognition and treatment of trau-
matic injuries with additional modules cov-
ering infectious disease, dermatology and
health development. Training culminated in
a final field exercise which included simu-
lated patients. Each medic received
hands-on live training and testing on basic
and advanced trauma skills, which
included: airway management with endo-
tracheal intubation and surgical airways,
needle chest decompression and tube thora-
costomy, intravenous access including
intraosseus access and venous cut down,
burn and blast injury management, and
haemorrhage control with pressure, tourni-
quets, and haemostatic bandages. All other
members of the battalion received a multi-
day curriculum of medical instruction mod-
elled on the combat lifesaver course.
The battalion surgeon was assigned to
the unit 1 month prior to deployment and
began daily lectures and hands-on training
classes on non-trauma care: daily sick call,
pharmacy and preventive medicine.
Together with the assigned physician
assistant, he heavily involved himself in
the final planning for medical support on
the battlefield. The two senior medics
who were planning to man the smaller
bases rotated to the local clinic to improve
their non-trauma skills.
With the sudden change in mission, the
additional training conducted prior to
deployment proved its value. In addition,
future steps were taken to sustain medical
skills in theatre through reinforcement
and validation testing of medic skills.
Common medical scenarios were exten-
sively rehearsed, and senior battalion and
brigade medical providers were rotated
through the remote bases on a routine
basis to verify training and provide add-
itional medical support. When possible,
line medics were rotated back through
larger bases for additional instruction and
training. Finally, a mobile training team
rotated throughout the major forward
operating bases to provide refresher train-
ing for all medics halfway through the
15-month deployment and validated skill
competency using standardised injuries on
a manikin model.
Personnel augmentation
While deploying to Afghanistan with a full
complement of medics, the non-doctrinal
employment of our combat forces required
a non-doctrinal approach to health support.
As the only medical assets in the area, the
infantry medical platoon also provided
medical coverage to nearby or co-located
units. These included the Engineer Route
Clearance Package, the Logistic Convoy
Element, a composite Armored Security
Vehicle platoon, the commander’s Personal
Security Detachment and a liaison team to
a NATO infantry company. With the major-
ity of medics in the field on a day-to-day
basis, the main battalion aid stations, which
were already conducting split operations,
were often manned only by one creden-
tialed provider and one or two medics.
Following the initial casualty experience,
further analysis of the medical support plan
determined that each firebase should have
at least two combat medics. This would
provide the firebase leadership the ability to
send one medic out on patrol while leaving
one medic at the firebase in the event of an
attack. Based on this analysis, an additional
medic was moved to each of the firebase,
sometimes using a medic augmented from
other brigade units. We recommend that
this practice be implemented by any unit
supporting firebases where there are not
enough medics to provide simultaneous
medical coverage at the firebase and with
patrolling units.
Expanded equipment and capabilities
In addition to increasing the number of
medics at each firebase, our post-event
analysis highlighted the need to equip the
firebase aid stations to be able to hold
patients for extended periods of time.
2 Wilson RL, et al. J R Army Med Corps Month 2013 Vol 0 No 0
Personal view
Each aid station was provided oxygen,
additional litters, patient warming capabil-
ity, an expanded formulary of medical
equipment and supplies, medical reference
books, additional trauma equipment and
dedicated communication platforms.
Major treatment protocols and algorithms
were reviewed, revised and posted clearly
in each aid station.
In addition to staged improvements in
infrastructure and medical equipment at
each firebase, additional medical capabil-
ities were expanded through training
initiatives. Providers at each Role I facility
conducted regular training sessions and
clinic-based teaching for the evaluation
and treatment of both trauma and non-
trauma conditions. Medics rotating in and
out of the smaller firebases were permit-
ted to carry and employ equipment for
more advanced emergency procedures
once they had demonstrated their abilities
to the satisfaction of the Battalion
Surgeon. Every medic was held to the
same standard and had to show compe-
tency in essential trauma skills before
being allowed to serve at a firebase. Over
time, the scope of practice and compe-
tency level for the firebase medics signifi-
cantly increased, translating into improved
care for battle and non-battle injuries.
Proven communications plan
Given the non-contiguous battlefield,
redundant communication systems allowed
medical providers to export expertise and
direct medical care at remote locations. For
medics located on firebases, communication
platforms provided a lifeline when patients
presented with critical injuries or complex
medical issues. While not a substitute for
face-to-face patient interaction, redundant
communication systems enabled improved
care and oversight. While video telecom-
munications and e-mail consultation would
have been optimal, few firebases had inter-
net capability. Voice communications were
typically the only form of communication.
Redundant systems, such as civilian cell-
phone, satellite phone, voice over internet
protocol phone and FM radio created a
layered communications plan—and pro-
vided backup when one of the systems
failed.
Providers proactively contacted their
medics on a regular basis, both to provide
routine medical consultation and to main-
tain constant situational awareness of the
medical issues at each firebase.
Additionally, the medical platoon leader-
ship attempted to visit each firebase regu-
larly to support their medics, gain a
firsthand understanding of their condi-
tions and conduct quality assessments.
Given the increased stress placed on
medics at remote firebases, deliberate efforts
to provide encouragement and constructive
feedback were provided to each medic after
significant patient care was performed and
the patient was evacuated. These debriefings
were conducted in person, if possible, or by
telephone to both improve the provision of
care and decrease the risks of burnout or
stress accumulation.
While these changes were initiated and
implemented in one battalion based upon
our specific requirements, the training and
resource interventions were shared with
the other units in the theatre as a firebase
risk mitigation strategy. For our unit, it
became standard operating procedure to
have at least two medics assigned to each
firebase, and the practice was continued
by the relieving unit. While quantitative
measurements of trauma and non-trauma
medical skills were not captured during
the deployment, medic skills improved
qualitatively based upon the condition of
patients evacuated to higher levels of care
with improve resuscitation and pre-
hospital care.
CASUALTY CARE 1 YEAR LATER
In January 2008, an enemy combatant
was shot in the chest during a direct fire
engagement in a remote district. The
on-scene platoon medic assessed the cas-
ualty and immediately sealed the chest
wound. Due to adverse weather condi-
tions preventing point-of-injury
MEDEVAC, the casualty was ground evac-
uated in an up-armoured vehicle to the
platoon firebase, which was supported by
two combat medics. Air MEDEVAC was
launched to retrieve the casualty but was
forced to abort due to the inclement
weather. The casualty’s condition deterio-
rated while the medics discussed the
patient’s care with the battalion surgeon
via telephone and radio. Following stabil-
isation with recurrent needle decompres-
sion, the medics cared for the patient in
shifts with regular remote input from the
battalion surgeon. Sixteen hours later,
during a 30-min break in the weather, the
casualty was evacuated on a CH-47 heli-
copter conducting an emergency resupply.
En route care was delivered by an add-
itional medic intentionally loaded on the
helicopter at a prior resupply stop. The
casualty was flown directly to the battal-
ion aid station where the battalion
surgeon performed tube thoracostomy
and intubated the patient. Holding the
patient at the Battalion Aid Station until
further MEDEVAC was available, the
patient was eventually evacuated to the
Role III hospital at Bagram Airfield. This
episode, like many others over the course
of the deployment, validated the efforts
made to improve the level and quality of
care provided at remote firebases by iso-
lated junior medics.
CONCLUSIONS
Our experiences in Afghanistan reinforce
the reality that today’s combat medics
often find themselves in remote inaccess-
ible locations, far from the direct supervi-
sion and support of a credentialed
medical provider, with limited or absent
ground or air evacuation capability. A
medic’s success under such challenging
circumstances hinges upon prior prepar-
ation and planning. The unique challenges
of firebase medical support must be taken
into consideration during a unit’s pre-
deployment phase. Even with excellent
pre-deployment analysis and planning,
however, the medical platoon must be
prepared for unanticipated difficulties and
changes. Careful and recurring threat
assessments to identify personnel, training
and equipment gaps, as well as ongoing
targeted individual and collective skills
training, will mitigate the many risks asso-
ciated with the delivery of effective fire-
base medicine, better support the mission
and, most importantly, save lives.
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